THE DISCOURSE OF *TAKFÎR*;
ITS POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL   REFLECTIONS

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ABSTRACT

Takfîr (accusing others of unbelief) has theological, political and ideological characters and has mainly been used as a means of excluding some people from many areas, political, religious, etc. This exclusive configuration continued its hegemony under the titles of hizb, party, sect, school, etc. However, when the Qur'an is assessed, this exclusionism will beyond doubt be substituted by inclusionism, a good many examples of which can easily be found when its attitude towards different groups and identities are analyzed. Referring to these identities, Islam summons all as co-partners to come to a common denomination and to agree on fundamentals. So we understand that the tradition of takfîr is not but contrary to the basic theistic philosophy of Islam. As will be seen from the following analysis, this takfîr tradition had once been fed by cultural, political and ideological factors, but in the course of time they had been formulated into theological and dogmatic doctrines.

Linguistically meaning to hide and to keep in secret[1] *Takfîr* in theological literature is used to call a fellow believer as unbeliever or infidel. *Takfîr* is in particular a concept of theological literature, but it gained an extensive use in Islamic thought in general. It is effectively manifest in the Islamic creedal system and in the formative period of Islamic sects. We shall discuss this *takfîr* discourse with its two aspects: first, the structure of the *takfîr* culture in theology and its reflections and how it was established theologically and secondly the political and ideological bases of *takfîr* and its social repercussions.

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[1] İbn Fâris İbn Zakariyyâ, *Al- Maqâyîs fi'l Luga*, Dâru'l fikr, Beirut 1994, p.930-931.

A. The Theological Basis of *Takfîr*

The theological and ideological characteristics of *takfîr* are too complex to be distinguished from one another. *Takfîr*, with respect to the starting point of which political and ideological attitudes are dominant, had to take on a theological outlook in order to gain legitimacy. For ideological and political debates derived their legitimacy from religious sources, and the easiest way to do that was to make legitimate the *takfir* discussions by means of the *hadith* of the Prophet. One of these *hadîth*s is known as the *hadîth* of *"al-Firqa al-Najiyah"*, the party of salvation, the most common form of which is as follows: "My community will be divided into 73 parties and all will go to hell except the one which follows my path and that of my companions..."[2]

Based on this hadith, historians of sects tried to formulate these 73 parties in different ways and accused the parties other their their own of heresy, *bid'a* (innovation) or infidelity. Thus, the notion of "salvation" of Islam was reformulated by the absolutist claims of the sects[3]. The *hadith* of *al-Firqâ al-Nâjiyah* not only is not a *mutawâtir* one but it is also doubtful that it meets the criteria of the *sahîh* (authentic) *hadith*. Theologically speaking, in matters related to belief, a *hadith* can only gain certainty if it meets the requirement of *tawatur*. There were many debates about the authenticity of this *hadîth* in Kalâm and Hadîth sources. We shall not deal with the issue of authenticity now as it is not directly related to the subject.

Although there is no mention of any sect in the *hadîth* at issue, members of all sects claimed that it was their own party that is said to attain salvation.[4] This claim led members of each sect to deem others illegitimate and to call them with disparaging names.[5] For example the Salafîs in particulars and the Sunni scholars in general called Muslim theologians, especially the Mu'tazila, as the people of whim and as *'mu'attila'*, meaning those who negate God's attributes, or as the 'Zoroastrians of the community'. Similarly the Sunnite scholars named the Shi'a as "Râfidis".[6] The Mu'tazila was called by its opponents as "Qadariyya" with an intent of vilifying them,[7] while its members called themselves as

[2] Abû Dâvûd, *Sunan*, Egypt 1950, II, pp. 503-504.
[3] Malatî, Abû'l-Husayn Muhammad b. Ahmad, *Et-Tanbîh wa'r-Radd*, İstanbul 1939, p. 143.
[4] Shaybânî, *Kitâbu's- Sunna*, al-Maktabatu'l-İslâmî, Beirut 1985, I, 32-34; Âjurrî, Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Husayn, *Ash-Sharî'a*, Dâru'l-Kutub-i'l-Ilmiyya, Beirut 1983, p.32.
[5] 'Abd Allah b. Ahmad b. Hanbal, *Kitâbu's-Sunna*, Dâru Ibni'l-Qayyim, Riyâd 1981, I, p.102, 194, II/392; Âjurrî, *Ash-Sharî'a*, p. 74.
[6] Baghdâdî, Abû Mansûr Abdulqâhir b. Tâhir, *El-Farq bayna'l-Fıraq*, Mu'assasâtu'l-Halebî, Cairo, n.d., p. 22, 34, 45, 57; Yahya b. Husayn, *Rasâilu'l-'Adl wa't-Tawhîd*, Dâru'l-Hilâl, Cairo 1971, p. 19, 23, 34, 35, 38, 68, 129.
[7] Isfarâyinî, Abû'l-Muzaffar, *At-Tabsîr fî'd-Dîn*, 'Âlamu'l-Kutub, Beirut 1983, p. 90-95, Îjî, Abdu'r Rahmân b. Ahmad, *Al-Mawâqıf*, Mektebetu'l-Mutanabbî, Cairo, n.d., p. 415.

"*Ashâb al-'Adl wa al-Tawhîd*" (the People of Justice and Unity)[8] to praise themselves.[9]

In general, four important systems, which were fed by the theological frame derived from the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah, came into existence: the Jabriyya, the Mu'tazila, the 'Ash'arîyya and Mâturidiyya. While the first one held fatalism, the second supported human freedom, and the last two maintained the *kasb* (acquisition) theory, reconciling fatalism and freedom.[10] These theories are actually human interpretations that have the Qur'an as their starting point. Although it has no legitimate basis to make interpretations subject to *takfîr,* we observe that the theory that tries to keep Allah away from all kinds of wickedness, vice, and evil on the one hand, and to accounts for wickedness, vice and evil through human free will on the other[11] was made subject of *takfîr* by the supporters of the rival theories.

It goes without saying that a human being is held responsible for everything he does. However, depriving human beings of their freedom fearing that the power of God could be impaired runs contrary to human responsibility. So just because the Mu'tazila emphasizes human freedom and hence human responsibility, it is unjustified to accuse them of unbelief as their opponents did.[12]

On theological level, it could easily be seen that *takfîr* has such an extensive use in a way that concerns all aspects of the articles of belief. Apart from the issues mentioned above, we observe this in discussions on such issues as *imamah* (leadership), prophethood, and the belief in the Last Day, immortality of soul, or bodily resurrection, etc.

In his examination of the tradition of *takfîr,* al-Ghazalî notes: "regarding the issue of *takfir*, the sects have extremism and bigotry. Nearly all of them accused the other sects of unbelief, except the one to which they belong ..." While al-Ghazalî criticized the discourse of *takfir* as widespread among Muslim sects,[13] he himself nonetheless accused some Muslim philosophers of unbelief on some issues[14] including the doctrine of the eternity of the world, God's not knowing the particulars, and the denial of bodily resurrection. Similarly al-Ash'arî accused the Mu'tazila of unbelief on nine issues, some of which are the impossibility of beautific vision, (Allah will not be seen by physical eyes in the world to come), the denial of

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[8] Yahyâ b. Husayn, *Rasâilu'l-'Adl wa't-Tawhîd,* p. 211, Îjî, *Al-Mawâqıf,* p. 415.

[9] Hanafî, Hasan, *Min al-'Akîda ilâ'th -Thawra,* Cairo 1988, V, p. 340.

[10] 'Ash'arî, Abû'l-Hasan, *El-Luma',* Egypt 1954, pp. 69-91; Mâturidî, *Kitâbu't-Tawhid,* İstanbul 1979, p. 221-314.

[11] The Qur'an, Muddaththir, 38; Najm, 38-41; Shams, 7-10.

[12] Îjî, *Al-Mawâqıf,* p. 315-327; 'Abd Allah b. Ahmad b. Hanbal, *Kitâbu's-Sunna,* I, p. 104-105.

[13] Ghazalî, Abû Hâmid M. b. Muhammad, *Faysalu't-Tafriqa,* Dâru'l-Hikma, Beirut 1986, p. 39-49.

[14] Gölcük, Şerafettin, *Kelâm Tarihi,* Esra Yayınları, İstanbul 1998, p. 168.

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[9] Hanafî, Hasan, *Min al-'Akîda ilâ'th -Thawra*, Cairo 1988, V, p. 340.

[10] 'Ash'arî, Abû'l-Hasan, *El-Luma'*, Egypt 1954, pp. 69-91; Mâturidî, *Kitâbu't-Tawhid*, İstanbul 1979, p. 221-314.

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[14] Gölcük, Şerafettin, *Kelâm Tarihi*, Esra Yayınları, İstanbul 1998, p. 168.

punishment in the grave, the eternal damnation of grave sinners, and so on.[15]

B. Political and Ideological Basis of *Takfîr*

Although *takfîr* by definition should the subject matter of theological discourse, it was transferred into political sphere as a means of pursuing political aspirations. In the relationship between ruling power and opposition, *takfîr* was exploited to terminate the opposition.[16]

It were the Kharijis who initiated the use of *takfîr* in the political sphere. It must be remembered that the Khariji school came into existence as a result of political debates as to who was eligible to lead the Muslim community. The Kharijis were devout worshippers, yet still the environment and the culture to which they belonged made their personality too intolerant to bear with others. This bigotry became the main factor sustaining the Khariji idea.

The Kharijis, unlike the Murjia, considered the deed as an inseparable part of faith, and considered neglecting rituals as a sign of infidelity. They went so far as to deny to the fellow members of the religion the tolerance that they maintained for the members of other religions. They considered these Muslims as pagans and they deemed it permissible the killing of not only the members of opposing groups but also that of their wives and children. They even went ahead and say that the adversaries along with their children will go to hell.[17]

In the same way, Ahl al-Sunna accused some Muslim groups of being infidels including the Murji'a, a moderate Muslim group.[18] Although the Murji'a and its great representative Abû Hanîfa developed their notion of faith by segregating faith and its practice in order to avoid accusing one another of unbelief, they could not escape being painted with the same brush.[19]

But the tyranny gained dominance over virtue and common sense. Throughout history the tyrants holding power in their hands implemented the concept of unbelief to suppress their opponents. Although the event of *mihna*/inquisition in Islamic history was completely political, it was discussed under the shade of religious and theological concepts and consequently these local events had an everlasting religious effect on succeeding Muslim communities.

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[15] 'Ash'arî, Abû'l-Hasan, *El-Ibâna*, Matbû'âtu Câmi'âti'l-Islâmiyye, Madîna 1975, p. 7-8.

[16] Hanafî, *Min al-'Akîda ilâ'th -Thawra*, V, p. 341-345.

[17] 'Ash 'arî, Abû'l-Hasan, *Maqâlât al-Islâmiyyîn*, (H. Ritter), Wiesbaden 1980, I, 87, 127; Îjî, *Al-Mawâqıf*, p.424-427.

[18] 'Ash'arî, *Maqâlât al-Islâmiyyîn*, I, 132, 154.

[19] 'Ash'arî, *Maqâlât al-Islâmiyyîn*, I, p. 138; Shahristânî, Abû'l-Fath Muhammad b. Abdi'-l-Karim, *al-Milal wa'n-Nihal*, Cairo 1947, I, p. 225-226.

Even the first years of Islamic history began with this discourse of *takfîr*. After the six years of 'Uthmân's caliphate, some ideological and political debates resulted in accusing one another of unbelief including the Caliph 'Uthmân. The Kharijis who formerly supported 'Alî later on accused him of apostasy along with many of the companions of the Prophet. One instance is worth mentioning from a Shi'ite source:

According to a *hadîth* narrated by Abû Ja'far in a book called *Nafsu'r-Rahmân*, after the Prophet's death, all people except three (Mikdâth, Abû Dharr and Salmân) became infidels as they did not accept the authority of 'Alî. According to another two narratives, except the people mentioned above, the whole companions perished. In another narrative the names of 'Ammâr, Abu Sâsân al-Ansarî, Huzayfa and 'Amr were added to those who escaped being called infidels.[20]

Takfîr was also used in politics to render invalid the legitimacy of the government and that of opposition. Some essential principles of the religion in this area such as capability, knowledge, justice, and solving the problems by consensus were ignored and the rulers took refuge in the dogmas like the *vasiyya* and the idea of belonging to the tribe of Quraysh, limiting the political area to some formal prerequisites.

The theoretical *takfîr* in the theological field was not limited to this area and was carried into political, social, and legal spheres. One of its clear instances occurred in politics. The culture of *takfîr* on the political level hindered any prospective development or change and made dogmatism the reigning power. This resulted in the obliteration of even the possibility of advancing a new idea in this sphere.

Ahl al-Sunna lay down two criteria for *takfîr*: 1) to deny a religious principle known through *tawâtur*, and 2) to refuse something known as true by *ijmâ'*(consensus).[21] In this context, al-Ghazâlî declares that the denial of such compulsory worships as praying, fasting and pilgrimage causes someone to be judged as an infidel. With the second criterion, *ijmâ'*, the situation is a little different in that it is extremely difficult to say that the *ijma'* constitutes a certain proof. For there are many controversies with regard to *ijmâ'* whether it is restricted to a certain time or it is perpetual; and whether or not it is valid for a limited area, etc. And it is also well known that *ijmâ'* was developed mostly under political considerations rather than theological. Keeping all this in mind, it is rather difficult to claim that one deserves to be charged with unbelief when he rejects any judgment passed through *ijmâ'*, controversial or not. To do so is nothing but an attack on individual rights, many examples of which can be found in the past such

[20] At-Tabarsî, *Nafsu'r-Rahman*, al-Maktabatu'l-Adabiyya, Najaf, n.d., III, Bab 15; Khayyât, *Al-Intisâr*, Cairo 1988, p. 210; 'Ash'arî, *Maqâlât al-Islâmiyyîn*, I, p.16.

[21] Baghdadî, Abû Mansûr Abdulqâhir b. Tâhir, *Usûl ad-Dîn*, Dâru'l-Âfâq, Beirut 1981, p. 126-129.

as limiting individual religious freedom. But limiting individual rights according to a consensus which was uncertain brought about many violations. As a result, the cultural environment in which individual consciousness was weak and tribal perception was a determining factor, religious freedom and individual rights were much restricted. For example, a believer was considered to be an apostate just because of his extreme opinions and was easily judged to be executed; and his funeral prayer not to be performed, and his properties to be distributed among Muslims as spoils.[22]

Under these circumstances, a person who was seen as apostate was deprived of his civil and natural rights by being put under pressure "politically" through the judgment of capital punishment, "socially" by denying him funeral prayer, and "economically" by pillaging his properties.[23]

There are some other grave examples: the Jahmiyya, the Qadariyya and the Mu'tazila, who claimed that "the Qur'ân was created", were accused of being infidels, their leadership in prayer was forbidden,[24] their wives were judged as unlawful to their husbands, their patients and funerals were not to be visited, and people like them were thought to resurrect with pagans in the hereafter.[25]

The term "takfîr" is systematically fed by such descriptions as Hashwî, Qadarî, Mu'tazili, Râfidî, Mubtedi', Ghulât, etc. The following quote is from al-Baghdadî's "Usul ad-dîn" "...our religious scholars have a consensus that the daily prayer cannot be performed behind someone belonging to the Mu'tazila."[26] He thus made contributions to the takfîr culture. Also in another part of the same source, it is said that "It is necessary for someone who perform salat behind the Qadarîs and the Râfidis who destroyed divine oneness to re-perform his prayer.[27] This view was also accepted by al-Shâfi'î, Mâlik, Dâwûd al-Zâhirî, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Ishâk Ibn Rahwayh and their followers.

Just as the culture of takfîr developed essentially through and excluding, coercive and alienating process, so the culture feeding on this discourse will contribute to its perpetuity. This attitude shifted its main political and ideological focus to theological one and became a doctrine. So the social life was transformed into a field of conflict by virtue of theological, legal and ideological attitudes that were all exclusivist.[28]

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[22] Baghdadî, Usûl ad-Dîn, p. 189.

[23] Baghdadî, Usûl ad-Dîn, p. 189.

[24] 'Abd Allah b. Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Kitâbu's-Sunna, I, p.102-129, 384, II, 385),

[25] 'Abd Allah Ibn Ahmad b. Hanbal, Kitâbu's-Sunna, I, p.105-106; Âjurrî, Ash-Sharî'a, p. 149, 150, 190, 191.

[26] Baghdâdî, Usûl ad-Dîn, p. 189; 'Abd Allah Ibn Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, Kitâbu's-Sunna, I, p. 102-129, 384.

[27] Baghdâdî, Usûl ad-Dîn, p. 340-342.

[28] Baghdâdî, Usûl ad-Dîn, p. 189; Hanafî, Min al-'Akîda ilâ'th -Thawra, V, p. 400-401.

One of the most important results of this is the jurisprudential regulations that suspended the validity of the legal testimony of these excluded people or sects who are thought to be *ahl al-ahvâ*." Imam Malik totally rejected their witnessing. Abû Hanîfa and al-Shafi'i came to the conclusion that their witnessing would be acceptable. Al-Shafi'î was said to be silent about whether to attribute infidelity to the Ghulât, a fraction of the Râfidis, but later in his *Kitâb al-Qiyâs* he states that he does not accept their witnessing.[29]

It seems that the legal and theological schools that have different theological positions could not avoid being accused of *takfîr* or being labeled as *mubtadi'* in the least.[30] Furthermore, by being excluded and isolated from the political and social areas, these people were treated worse than someone who committed a crime of thought. In fact the characteristics a witness should have are his being trustworthy and not being a liar. It is not but an ideological isolation to strip some thinking differently off his/her being eligibility for witnessing.

Each sect naturally thought that they were the only representative of the truth and so criticized the other points of view, since none was open to criticisms. And no sect or person would consider his views as *heva* or *bid'ah*. On the contrary, here we see an attitude that sees his own view as absolute truth and that of others as absolute false. This monopoly of truth first created political and ideological conflict and then the theological, which undermined pluralism and scientific attitude that advocate the idea of tolerating others and respecting their thoughts. The ideological character of absolutism, instead of searching for truth, is actualized in the form of imposing what one thinks is truth on the opponent. This can clearly be seen in their condemning each other for being *ahl al-hava*", *bid'a* inventor, Hashwi, or, people of ignorance, etc."[31]

There are many reflections of this attitude in the literature of *fiqh*. One of them is the *fatwa* (legal verdict) saying that the meat of an animal slaughtered by those who were excluded as *ahl al-hawa* cannot be eaten,[32] in spite of the fact that it is certainly known that any animal slaughtered in the name of Allah is *halâl* to eat.[33]

One of the ideological *"fatwas"* disturbing the social peace and causing social unrest is the one that forbade the members of different sects thinking of each other as people of *bid'a* to marry women from one another. That *fatwa* was formulated thus by al-Baghdâdî who was known for his intolerant

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[29] Baghdadî, *Usûl ad-Dîn*, p. 341-342.

[30] 'Abd Allah Ibn Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, *Kitâbu's-Sunna*, I, p. 120-129; Lâlekâî, Abu'l-Qâsim, Hibetullah b. Hasan b. Mansûr at-Tabarî, *Sharhu Usûli I'tikâdi Alhli's Sunna wa'l-Jama'a*, Riyâd, h. 1402, IV, p. 706-711.

[31] Yahyâ ibn Husayn, *Rasâilu'l-'Adl wa't-Tawhîd*, II, p. 34, 35, 38, 81.

[32] Baghdâdî, *Usûl ad-Dîn*, p. 340-341.

[33] Hanafî, *Min al-'Akîda ilâ'th -Thawra*, V, 401-402.

attitudes illustrated in tte following passage: "According to the companions of the Prophet Muhammad, it is not right for a Muslim women to marry one of them... If they marry, their marriage contracts are not valid. If the woman was with him without knowing that truth, *'iddah¹* would be necessary for her. And for the sexual intercourse, only *mahr al-misl* (ordinary dowry), not *mahr al-musamma* (the determined dowry), is paid to the woman. Marrying one of those women is certainly forbidden..." [34]

There are also "economical" reflections of *takfîr* in addition to its political and social repercussions. The most basic manifestation of this is the suspension of economical rights. Thus, the individual is deprived of his rights of inheritance, loot, voting and bring elected, making contracts; and he was even sometimes prevented from the services of the state; consequently, to put it in our contemporary context, individuals were deprived of all of their civil rights as a citizen. [35]

Al-Baghdâdî seems to have tackled such issues in his book mentioned above: "Scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah have consensus that any member of these groups like the Râfidis, the Khârijîs, the Murci'a and their 72 fractions cannot be an inheritor to someone from Ahl al-Sunnah. But they disagreed on whether any Sunnite can be an inheritor to these groups. Hâris al-Muhâsibî[36][ii] denied their inheritance mutually and rejected his father's fortune as he was a Qadarite. Contrary to this judgment another view on this controversial issue was narrated from Mu'âz ibn Jabal saying that any Muslim could be inheritor to an infidel, yet no infidel can be an inheritor to a Muslim. And some Muslim scholars judged on this subject accordingly.

According to Abû Hanîfa, a Sunnite could be an inheritor to a person deviated from the right path only for the properties that he earned before he became a heretic. Also it is narrated in *Sahîh al-Muslim* that a Muslim could be an inheritor to an apostate's earnings before he became an apostate. His earnings after his apostasy would be given to Muslims as loot. [37]

Baghdâdî concludes the issue with his theological judgment; "... If the *bid'a* of any group is like that of the Qadariya, our theologians are of the opinion that no mutual inheritance would be allowed between Ahl al-Sunnah and these groups. That is why Hâris al-Muhâsibî rejected taking the fortune of his Qadarite/Mu'tazilite father" [38]

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[34] Baghdâdî, *Usûl ad-Dîn*, 1981, p. 141.
[35] Hanafi, *Min al-'Akîda ilâ'th-Thawra*, V, p. 402.
[36] He is one of the first kalam scholars of Ahl al-Sunnah. He is a friend of Ibn Kullâb by whom al-Ash'arî was also influenced. He holds that the Qur'an was not created, conflicting that which the Mu'tazila held. ('Ash'arî, *Maqâlâtu'l-Islâmiyyîn*, I, 169-173, II, 298-299.)
[37] Baghdâdî, *Usûl ad-Dîn*, p. 341.
[38] Baghdâdî, *Usûl ad-Dîn*, p. 189.

These religious decrees which are totally contrary to the Qur'an are by far the greatest blow on personal property, one of the most important constituents of human rights. In such an environment, properties of a person could be confiscated just because of his thoughts. In addition, that person may be forbidden from being an inheritor to someone else, and even purchasing someone else's properties and thus acquiring goods and properties. It is thus that political opponents were eliminated from the economic area just as they were eliminated from the political and social spheres. What is surprising is that, contrary to those *fatwâs*, it was accepted as a right for a Muslim to be an inheritor to the "People of the Book", despite the fact that this was not seen as permissible among Muslims of different theological or legal sects.[39]

Conclusion

The exclusion of and the discrimination against the people who are deprived of their political, social and economic rights in Islamic culture gained a dogmatic character through theological and legal decrees. We can say that this historical experience gained a place in political literature, took on an ideological outlook and resulted in a fanatic perspective. One of the important indicators of this attitude could be found in the following examples. The verdict about "*dâru ahl al-ehvâ*", the country of the people of whim, is as follows: "...If Ahl al-Sunnah could live in a country where some heretic parties constitute the majority without hiding themselves and would express their Sunnite identity without any fear of life and property, that country is "*Dâr al-Islâm*"... If Ahl al-Sunnah would obtain these rights with their special effort, like paying much to obtain it, then this country is "*dâru'l-harb*" and "*dâr al-kufr*".

Sunnite theologians and *fiqh* scholars disagreed on the status of those who were accused of infidelity while they were drawing the details of this general frame: 1) Some claimed that animals slaughtered by these people cannot be eaten and their woman cannot be married. Their legal status is the same as that of the Zoroastrian. They should give *jizya* (minority tax). This is the opinion of Abû Ishâq Isfahânî. 2) Others share the opinion that they are apostate. Consequently they do not give *jizya*, and cannot be made slaves. Al-Baghdâdî also shares this view.[40]

Such an excluding attitude considered any difference as a sign of and a reason for conflict and entered the political literature as a determinative factor. This political and ideological conflict determined the properties of the people accused of *kufr* as loot and their country as the land of war.[41] Thus, the holders of different views were kept in a limited area and were deprived

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[39] Baghdâdî, *Usûl ad-Dîn*, p. 189, 341, 342; Hanafi, *Min al-'Akîda ilâ'th -Thawra*, 1988, V, p. 402-403.
[40] Baghdâdî, *Usûl ad-Dîn*, p. 342, 343.
[41] Hanafî, *Min al-'Akîda ilâ'th -Thawra*, V, p. 403-404.

of the basic human rights. As a result, the basic freedom and the rights canonized as the five principles that are accepted by Islam could not find a chance to survive.

We understand the accusation of people with unbelief for their beliefs, opinions, and sects or schools they belong to as a problem stemming from the fact that the true Islam was not properly understood and practiced in its fullness. This excluding attitude which seems to gain an ontological and indispensable status with religion rests in fact on the ancient Arab societal traditions, i.e. the tribal and clan organizations, not on Islamic practice. And it goes without saying that this historical *takfîr* experience is in conflict with the main perspective of Islam.